We consider fault-tolerant boolean formulas in which the output of a faulty gate is shortcircuited to one of the gate's inputs. A recent result by Kalai et al. [FOCS 2012] converts any boolean formula into a resilient formula of polynomial size that works correctly if less than a fraction 1/6 of the gates (on every input-to-output path) are faulty. We improve the result of Kalai et al., and show how to efficiently fortify any boolean formula against a fraction 1/5 of short-circuit gates per path, with only a polynomial blowup in size. We additionally show that it is impossible to obtain formulas with higher resilience and sub-exponential growth in size.
Introduction
Kleitman, Leighton and Ma [KLM97] asked the following question: assume you wish to build a logic circuit C from AND and OR gates, however, due to some confusion, some small amount of AND gates were placed in the box of the OR gates (and vice versa), and there is no way to distinguish between the two types of gates just by looking at them. Can you construct a "resilient" logic circuit C ′ that computes the same functionality of C, even if some (small amount) of the AND gates are replaced with OR gates (and vice versa)?
The above toy question is a special case of a more general type of noise (faulty gates) known as short-circuit noise. In this model, a faulty gate "short-circuits" one of its input-legs to the outputleg. That is, the output of the gate is determined by the value of one of its input-legs. The specific input that is connected to the output is determined by an all-powerful adversary, possibly as a function of the input to the circuit. This model is equivalent to a setting in which a faulty gate can be replaced with an arbitrary function g, as long as it holds that g(0, 0) = 0 and g(1, 1) = 1. Note that this type of noise is different from the so-called von Neumann noise model for circuits [vN56] , in which the noise flips the value of each wire in the circuit independently with probability p. See [KLM97, KLR12] and references therein for a comparison between these two separate models.
The first solution to the above question-constructing circuits that are resilient to short-circuit faults-was provided by Kleitman et al. [KLM97] . They show that for any number e, a circuit of size |C| gates can be transformed into a "resilient" circuit of size |C ′ | that behaves correctly even if up to e of its gates are faulty (short-circuited), and it holds that |C ′ | ≤ O(e · |C| + e log 3 ).
Further progress was made by Kalai, Lewko, and Rao [KLR12] showing, for any constant ε > 0, how to convert any formula 1 F of size |F | into a resilient formula F ′ of size |F ′ | = poly ε (|F |) such that F ′ computes the same function that F computes, as long as at most ( 1 6 − ε)-fraction of the gates in any input-to-output path in F ′ suffer from short-circuit noise. Kalai et al. explicitly leave open the question of finding the optimal fraction of faulty gates for a resilient formula F ′ . 2 We make further progress on the above open question and show that 1 5 is a tight bound on the tolerable fraction of faulty gates per input-to-output path, conditioned that the increase in the size of the formula is sub-exponential. Namely, we show how to convert any formula to a resilient version that tolerates up to a fraction 1 5 − ε of short-circuit gates per path, Theorem 1.1 (Main, informal). For any ε > 0, any formula F can be efficiently converted into a formula F ′ of size |F ′ | = poly ε (|F |) that computes the same function as F even when up to 1 5 − ε of the gates in any of its input-to-output paths are short-circuited.
We also show that our bound is tight. Namely, for an arbitrary formula F , it is impossible to make a resilient version (of sub-exponential size in |F |) that tolerates a fraction 1 5 (or more) of short-circuit gates per path.
Theorem 1.2 (Converse).
There exists a formula F for computing some function f , such that no formula F ′ of size |F ′ | = o(exp(|F |)) that computes f is resilient to a fraction 1 5 of short-circuit noise in any of its input-to-output paths.
1 A formula is a circuit in which each gate has fan-out 1. 2 For instance, it is clear that if all the gates in an input-to-output path can be short-circuited (i.e., the fraction of noise is 1), then the adversary has full control on the output of the circuit. Hence, the optimal noise rate for formulas lies within the range [ , 1].
Similar to the work of Kalai et al. [KLR12] , a major ingredient in our result is a transformation, known as the Karchmer-Wigderson transformation (hereinafter, the KW-transformation) [KW90] , between a formula that computes a boolean function f , and a two-party interactive communication protocol for a task related to f which we denote the KW-game for f , or KW f for short. Similarly, a reverse KW-transformation converts protocols back to formulas; see below and Section 6.1 for more details on the KW-transformation. The work of Kalai et al. adapts the KW-transformation to a noisy setting in which the formula may suffer from short-circuit noise, and the protocol may suffer from channel noise. The "attack plan" in [KLR12] for making a given formula F resilient to short-circuit noise is (i) apply the KW-transformation to obtain an interactive protocol π; (ii) Convert π to a noise-resilient protocol π ′ that tolerates up to δ-fraction of noise; (iii) apply the (reverse) KW-transformation on π ′ to obtain a formula F ′ . The analysis of [KLR12] shows that the obtained F ′ is resilient to δ/2 fraction of noise in any of its input-to-output paths.
The interactive protocols π, π ′ are defined in a setting where the parties have access to a noiseless feedback channel-the sender learns whether or not its transmission arrived correctly at the other side. Building upon recent progress in the field of coding for interactive protocols (see, e.g., [Gel17] ), Kalai et al. [KLR12] construct a coding scheme for interactive protocols (with noiseless feedback) that features resilience of δ = 1 3 − ε for any ε > 0; this gives their result. Note that a resilience of δ = 1/3 is maximal for interactive protocols in that setting [EGH16] , suggesting that new techniques must be introduced in order to improve the result by [KLR12] .
The loss in resilience witnessed in step (iii) stems from the fact that short-circuit noise affects formulas in a "one-sided" manner: a short-circuit of an AND gate can only turn the output from 0 to 1. A short-circuit in an OR gate can only turn the output from 1 to 0. The noisy AND gates are thus decoupled from the noisy OR gates: if the output of the circuit is 0, any amount of shortcircuited OR gates will keep the output 0 and if the output is 1 any amount of short-circuited AND gates will keep the output 1; see Lemma 6.3. Informally speaking, this decoupling reduces by half the resilience of circuits generated by the KW-transformation. Assume the formula F ′ obtained from the above process is resilient to δ ′ -fraction of noise. Then F ′ is correct if on a specific inputto-output path (a) at most δ ′ -fraction of the AND gates are short-circuited, but also if (b) at most δ ′ -fraction of the OR gates are short-circuited. Since the noise is decoupled, from (a) and (b) we get that F outputs the correct value even when 2δ ′ -fraction of the gates on that input-to-output path are noisy. Yet, the resilience of F ′ originates in the resilience of π ′ (step (iii) above). The KWtransformation limits the resilience of F ′ by the resilience of π ′ , i.e., 2δ ′ ≤ δ, leading to a factor 2 loss.
We revisit the above line of thought and take a more careful noise analysis. Instead of bounding the total fraction of noise by some δ, we consider the case where the noise from Alice to Bob is bounded by some α while the noise in the other direction is bounded by β. A similar approach used by Braverman and Efremenko [BE17] , yields interactive protocols (without noiseless feedback) with maximal resilience. In more detail, assume that the protocol π communicates n symbols overall. We define an (α, β)-corruption as any noise that corrupts up to αn symbols sent by Alice and up to βn symbols sent by Bob. We emphasize that the noise fraction on Alice transmissions is higher than α, since Alice speaks less than n symbols overall; the global noise fraction in this case is α + β.
This distinction may be delicate but is instrumental. The KW-transformation translates a protocol of length n that is resilient to (α, β)-corruptions into a formula which is resilient to up to αn short-circuited AND gates in addition to up to βn short-circuited OR gates. When α = β the obtained formula is resilient to up to α-fraction of short-circuited gates in any input-to-output path, avoiding the factor 2 loss in resilience.
Techniques overview
Achievability: Coding schemes for noisy channels with noiseless feedback. We obtain resilient formulas by employing the approach of [KLR12] described above. In order to increase the noise resilience to its optimal level, we develop a novel coding scheme which is resilient to (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruptions, assuming noiseless feedback.
The mechanism of our coding scheme resembles, in a sense, the Blockchain technology [Nak08] . Given a protocol π 0 that assumes reliable channels, the parties simulate π 0 message by message. These messages may arrive at the other side correctly or not, however, a noiseless feedback channel allows each party to learn which of its messages made it through. With this knowledge, the party tries to create a "chain" of correct messages. Each message contains a pointer to the last message that was not corrupted by the channel. As time goes by, the chain grows and grows, and indicates the entire correct communication of that party. An appealing feature of this mechanism is the fact that whenever a transmission arrives correctly at the other side, the receiver learns all the correct transmissions so far. On the other hand, the receiver never knows whether a single received transmission (and the chain linked to it) is indeed correct.
The adversarial noise may corrupt up to (1/5−ε)n of the messages sent by each party. We think of the adversary as trying to construct a different, corrupt, chain. Due to its limited budget, at the end of the coding scheme one of two things may happen. Either it is the case that the correct chain is the longest, or it is the case where the longest chain contains in its prefix a sufficient amount of uncorrupted transmissions.
Indeed, if the adversary tries to create its own chain, its length is bounded by (1/5 − ε)n, while the correct chain is at least of length 2n/5. 3 On the other hand, the adversary can create a longer chain which forks off the correct chain. As a simple example, consider the case where a party sends ≈ 2n/5 messages which go through uncorrupted. Now the adversary starts corrupting the transmissions and extends the correct chain with (1/5 − ε)n corrupt messages. 4 The corrupt forked chain is of length 2n/5 + (1/5 − ε)n and may be longer than the correct chain. However, in this case, the information contained in the uncorrupted prefix of the corrupt forked chain is sufficient to simulate the entire transcript of π 0 .
Another essential part of our coding scheme is its ability to alter the order of speaking according to the observed noise. 5 Most previous work usually follows the succeeding intuition. If party's transmissions were corrupted, then the information contained in these transmissions still needs to reach the other side. Therefore, the coding scheme should allow that party to speak more times. In this work we take the opposite direction-the more a party is corrupted at the first part of the protocol, the less it speaks in the later part. The intuition here is that if the adversary has already wasted its budget on the party, it cannot corrupt much of the sequential transmissions and we can reduce their amount. A resembling approach appears in [AGS16] . 3 The order of speaking in the coding scheme depends on the noise and is not alternating. Therefore, it is not necessary that a party speak half of the times. See discussion below.
4 This attack assumes that there are n/5 additional rounds where the same party speak. This assumption is usually false and serves only for this intuitive (yet unrealistic) example.
5 Protocols that change their length or order of speaking as a function of the observed noise are called adaptive [GHS14, AGS16] . Since these decisions are noise-dependent, the parties may disagree on the identity of the speaker in each round, e.g., both parties may decide to speak in a given round, etc. We emphasize that due to the noiseless feedback there is always a consensus regarding whose turn it is to speak next. Hence, while our scheme has a non-predetermined order of speaking, the scheme is non-adaptive by the terminology of [EGH16] ; see discussion in [EGH16] and in Section 6 of [Gel17] .
One hurdle we face in constructing our coding scheme comes from the need to communicate pointers to previous messages using a small (constant-size) alphabet. Towards this end, we first show a coding scheme that works with a large alphabet that is capable of pointing back to any previous transmission. Next, we employ a variable-length coding, replacing each pointer with a large number of messages over a constant-size alphabet. We prove that this coding does not harm the resilience, leading to a coding scheme with a constant-size alphabet and optimal resilience to (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruptions.
Converse: Impossibility Bound. The converse proof consists of two parts. First, we show that for certain functions, any protocol resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions must have an exponential blowup in the communication. In the second part, we show a (noisy) KW-transformation from formulas to protocols. Together, we obtain an upper bound on the noise of formulas. Indeed, assuming that there is a "shallow" formula that is resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions, converting it into a protocol yields a "short" protocol with resilience to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions. The existence of such a protocol contradicts the bound of the first part.
The bound on the resilience of protocols follows a natural technique of confusing a party between two possible inputs. We demonstrate that a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption suffices in making one party (say, Alice) observe exactly the same transcript whether Bob holds y or y ′ . Choosing x, y, y ′ such that the output of the protocol differs between (x, y) and (x, y ′ ), leads to Alice erring on at least one of the two instances.
This idea does not work if the protocol is allowed to communicate a lot of information. To illustrate this point, assume f : Σ n × Σ n → Σ z defined over a channel with alphabet Σ. Consider a protocol where the parties send their inputs to the other side encoded via a standard Shannon error-correcting code of length n ′ = O(n) symbols, with distance 1−ε for some small constant ε > 0. The protocol communicates 2n ′ symbols overall, and a valid (1/5, 1/5)-corruption may corrupt up to 2n ′ /5 symbols of each one of the codewords. However, this does not suffice to invalidate the decoding of either of the codewords, since an error correcting code with distance ≈ 1 is capable of correcting up to ≈ n ′ /2 corrupted symbols.
On the other hand, once we limit the communication of the protocol, even moderately, to around n symbols, the above encoding is not applicable anymore. Quite informally, our lower bound follows the intuition described below. We show the existence of a function f such that for any protocol that computes f in r rounds (where r is restricted as mentioned above), the following properties hold for one of the parties (stated below, without loss of generality, for Alice). There are inputs x, x ′ , y, y ′ such that (1) f (x, y) = f (x ′ , y) = f (x ′ , y ′ ) and (2) Alice speaks at most r/5 times during the first 2r/5 rounds. Further, (3) when Alice holds x, the protocol communicates exactly the same messages during its first 2r/5 rounds, whether Bob holds y or y ′ (assuming no channel noise is present).
When we bound the protocol to these conditions, a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption is strong enough to make the transcript identical from Alice's point of view on (x ′ , y) and (x ′ , y ′ ), implying the protocol cannot be resilient to such an attack. In more details, we now describe an attack and assume Bob speaks at most 2r/5 times beyond round number 2r/5, given the attack. [If Bob speaks more, then an equivalent attack will be able to confuse Bob rather than Alice.] The attack changes the first 2r/5 rounds as if Alice holds x rather than x ′ ; this amounts to corrupting at most r/5 transmissions by Alice due to property (2) . Bob behaves the same regardless of its input due to property (3) . From round 2r/5 and beyond, the attack corrupts Bob's messages so that the next r/5 symbols Bob sends are consistent with y and the following r/5 symbols Bob communicates are consistent with y ′ . Since Bob speaks less than 2r/5 times (given the above noise), the attack corrupts at most r/5 of Bob's transmissions after round 2r/5.
Unfortunately, while the above shows that some functions f cannot be computed in a resilient manner, this argument cannot be applied towards a lower bound on resilient formulas. The reason is the KW f task is not a function, but rather a relation-multiple outputs may be valid for a single input. The attack on protocols described earlier shows that a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption drives the protocol to produce a different output than in the noiseless instance. However, it is possible that a resilient protocol gives a different but correct output.
Therefore, we need to extend the above argument so it applies to computations of arbitrary relations. Specifically, we consider the parity function on n bits and its related KW-game. We show the existence of inputs that satisfy conditions (2) and (3) above while requiring that the outputs of different inputs be disjoint. I.e., any possible output of (x ′ , y) is invalid for (x, y) and for (x ′ , y ′ ).
The last part of the converse proof requires developing a KW-transformation from formulas to protocols, in a noise-resilience preserving manner. Let us begin with some background on the (standard) KW-transformation (see Section 6.1 for a formal description). The KW game (or rather a slight adaptation we need for our purposes) is as follows. For a boolean function f on {0, 1} n , Alice gets an input x such that f (x) = 0 and Bob gets an input y such that f (y) = 1, their goal is to output a literal function ℓ(z) (i.e. one of the 2n functions of the form ℓ(z) = z i or ℓ(z) = ¬z i ) such that ℓ(x) = 0 and ℓ(y) = 1.
Let F be a boolean formula for f , consisting of ∨ and ∧ gates, and where all the negations are pushed to the input layer (i.e. F is a monotone formula of the literals z i , ¬z i ). The conversion of F to a protocol π for the KW f game is as follows. View the formula as the protocol tree, with the literals at the bottom of the tree being the output literal function. Assign each ∧ node to Alice, and each ∨ node to Bob.
The invariant maintained throughout the execution of the protocol is that if the protocol reaches a node v, then the value of v in F is 0 when evaluated on x, and 1 when evaluated on y. Each time when the protocol is at node v and it is Alice's turn to speak (thus v is an ∧ gate in F ), Alice sends the identity of a child which evaluates to 0 on x. Note that assuming the invariant holds for v, Alice can send the identity of such a child (since one of the inputs to an AND gate which outputs a 0 also evaluates to 0), while this child must evaluate to 1 on y assuming v evaluates to 1 on y. By maintaining this invariant, Alice and Bob arrive at the bottom, where they reach a literal evaluating to 0 on x and 1 on y. Note that there is some room for arbitrary decision making: if more than one child of v evaluates to 0 on x, Alice is free to choose any such child-the protocol will be valid for any such choice.
In this work we extend the above standard KW-transformation to the noisy-regime. Namely, we wish to convert a resilient formula into an interactive protocol π while keeping the protocol resilient to a similar level of channel noise. We note that the extension we need is completely different from previous uses of the KW-transformation. Indeed, for the achievability bound, a KW-transformation is used both in steps (i) and (iii) in the above outline of [KLR12] . However, the instance used in step (i) assumes there is no noise, while the instance in step (iii) works in the other direction, i.e., it transforms (resilient) protocols to (resilient) formulas.
Similar to the standard transformation, our noisy KW-transformation starts by constructing a protocol tree based on the formula's structure, where every ∧-gate is assigned to Alice and any ∨-gate to Bob. The main difference is in the decision making of how to proceeds when reaching a node v. The goal is to keep the invariant that the gate v in F evaluates to 0 on x and to 1 on y, even when noise is present.
When only one of v's descendants evaluates to 0 on x in F , Alice has no choice but to choose that child. However, when more than a single descendant evaluate to 0 on x, Alice's decision is less obvious. Moreover, this decision may affect the resilience of the protocol-it is possible that noise causes one of the descendants evaluate to 1 on that given x.
We observe, however, that one of v's children evaluates to 0 on x given all the noise patterns F is resilient against. The other children may still evaluate to 1 sometimes, as a function of the specific noise. Once we identify this special child that always evaluates to 0, Alice can safely choose it and maintain the invariant (and the correctness of the protocol), regardless of future noise. Giving some more details, we prove that if such a special child did not exist and all descendants could evaluate to both 0 and 1 as a function of the noise, then we could construct a noise E * that would make all descendants evaluate to 1 on x simultanously. Hence, assuming the noise is E * , the node v would evaluate to 1 on x, and consequently F (x) = 1. At the same time, we show that F is resilient to the noise E * , so F (x) = 0 assuming the noise is E * , and we reach a contradiction.
Other related work
The field of interactive coding schemes [Gel17] started with the seminal line of work by Schulman [Sch92, RS94, Sch96] . Commonly, the goal is to compile interactive protocols into a noiseresilient version that has (1) good noise resilience; (2) good rate; and (3) good probability of success. Computational efficiency is another desired goal. Numerous works achieve these goals, either fully or partially [BR14, GMS14, BKN14, FGOS15, BE17, GH14, KR13, Hae14, GHK + 16], where the exact parameters depend on the communication and noise model.
Most related to this work are coding schemes in the setting where a noiseless feedback channel is present. Pankratov [Pan13] gave the first interactive coding scheme that assumes noiseless feedback. The scheme of [Pan13] aims to maximize the rate of the scheme assuming all communication passes over a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with flipping parameter ε (i.e., a channel that communicates bits, where every bit is flipped with probability ε, independently of other bits). Pankratov's scheme achieves a rate of 1 − O( √ ε) when ε → 0. Gelles and Haeupler [GH17] improved the rate in that setting to 1 − O(ε log 1/ε), which is the current state of the art. For the regime of large noise, Efremenko, Gelles, and Haeupler [EGH16] provided coding schemes with maximal noise resilience, assuming noiseless feedback. They showed that the maximal resilience depends on the channel's alphabet size and on whether or not the order of speaking is noise-dependent. Specifically, they developed coding schemes with a noise-independent order of speaking and a constant rate that are resilient to 1/4 − ε and 1/6 − ε fraction of noise with a ternary and binary alphabet, respectively. When the order of speaking may depend on the noise, the resilience increases to 1/3 − ε for any alphabet size. They show that these noise levels are optimal and that no general coding scheme can resist higher levels of noise. There has been tremendous work on coding for noisy channels with noiseless feedback in the one-way (non-interactive) communication setting, starting with the work of Shannon, Horstein, and Berlekamp [Sha56, Hor63, Ber64] . It is known that the presence of feedback does not change the channel's capacity, however, it improves the error exponent. The maximal noise-resilience in this setting is also known. Recently, Haeupler, Kamath, and Velingker [HKV15] considered deterministic and randomized codes that assume a partial presence of feedback.
Organization
The first half of our paper considers interactive coding protocols over noisy channels with noiseless feedback. Section 3 proves that any interactive coding scheme that is resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions must exhibit a zero rate. Sections 4-5 describe our constant-rate coding scheme that is resilient to (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruptions. First, Section 4 describes a scheme with a large alphabet (polynomial in the length of the protocol). Then, Section 5 shows how to reduce the alphabet to a constant size.
The second half of the paper (Section 6) considers noise-resilient circuits. First, in Section 6.1 we recall the notions of formulas, short-circuit noise and the (noiseless) KW-transformation. In Section 6.2 we present our noise-preserving KW-transformation and show how to convert a resilient formula into a resilient protocol. This reduction (along with the impossibility of Section 3) proves the converse theorem, showing that the resilience we obtain for formulas is maximal. In Section 6.3 we provide the other direction, a noise-resilient transformation from protocols to formulas (following [KLR12] ). Employing the coding scheme of Section 5 we give an efficient method that compiles any formula into an optimal resilient version.
Preliminaries
Notations For integers i ≤ j we denote by [i, j] the set {i, i+1, . . . , j} any by [i] the set {1, . . . , i}. For a string s ∈ Σ * and two indices x, y ∈ {1, . . . , |s|}, x < y we let s[x, y] = s x s x+1 · · · s y . We will treat ∅ as the empty word, i.e., for any a ∈ Σ * we have a • ∅ = ∅ • a = a. For bits a, b ∈ {0, 1} we let a ⊕ b = a + b mod 2, and b = 1 − b. All logarithms are taken to base 2, unless the base is explicitly written.
Interactive Protocols In the interactive setting we have two parties, Alice and Bob, which receive private inputs x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , respectively. Their goal is to compute some predefined function f (x, y) : X × Y → Z by sending messages to each other. A Protocol describes for each party the next message to send, given its input and the communication received so far. We assume the parties send symbols from a fixed alphabet Σ. The protocol also determines when the communication ends and the output value (as a function of the input and received communication).
Formally, an interactive protocol π can be seen as a |Σ|-ary tree (also referred to as the protocol tree), where each node v is assigned either to Alice or to Bob. For any v node assigned to Alice there exists a mapping a v : X → Σ that maps the next symbol Alice should send, given her input. Similarly, for each one of Bob's nodes we set a mapping b v : Y → Σ. Each leaf is labeled with an element of Z. The output of the protocol on input (x, y) is the element at the leaf reached by starting at the root node, and traversing down the tree where at each internal node v owned by Alice (resp., Bob), if a v (x) = i (resp., b v (y) = i) the protocol advances to the i-th child of v. We conveniently denote Alice's nodes by the set V a and Bob's nodes by the set V b . We may assume that all the nodes in a given protocol tree are reachable by some input (x, y) ∈ X × Y (otherwise, we can prune that branch without affecting the behaviour of the protocol). Note that the order of speaking in π is not necessarily alternating and it is possible the same party is the sender in consecutive rounds. For any given transcript T , we denote π(· | T ) the instance of π assuming the history T . Specifically, assuming Alice is the sender in the next round (assuming the history so far is T ), then the next communicated symbol is π(x | T ).
The length of a protocol, denoted |π|, is the length of the longest root-to-leaf path in the protocol tree, or equivalently, it is the maximal number of symbols the protocol communicates in any possible instantiation. In the following we assume that all instances have the same length |π|. The communication complexity of the protocol is
Transmission Noise with Feedback We will assume the communication channel may be noisy, that is, the received symbol may mismatch with the sent symbol. All the protocols considered in this work assume the setting of noiseless feedback : the sender always learns the symbol that the other side received (whether corrupted or not). The receiver, however, does not know whether the symbol it received is indeed the one sent to him.
A noise pattern is defined as E ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |Σ| − 1, * } |Va|∪|V b | . For any node v, E v denotes the symbol that the receiver gets for the transmission that is done when the protocol reaches the node v. Specifically, say v is an Alice-owned node, then if E v = * , Bob receives the symbol sent by Alice; otherwise, E v = * , Bob receives the symbol E v . Note that due to the feedback, Alice learns that her transmission was corrupted as well as the symbol that Bob received, and the protocol descends to the node dictated by E v . We denote by π E the protocol π when the noise is dictated by E; we sometimes write π 0 for a run of the protocol with no transmission noise, i.e., with the pattern
We say that a protocol is resilient to a noise pattern E if for any (x, y) ∈ X × Y it holds that π E outputs the same value as π 0 . While it is common to limit the noise to a constant fraction of the transmissions, in this work we take a more careful look at the noise, and consider the exact way it affects the transmissions of each party. Definition 2.1. An (α, β)-corruption, is a noise pattern that changes at most α|π| symbols sent by Alice and at most β|π| symbols sent by Bob. Note that the effective (combined) noise rate is (α + β).
Resilience to (1/5, 1/5)-Corruptions is Impossible
In this section we prove that no coding scheme with constant overhead can be resilient to a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption. To this end we show a specific (1/5, 1/5)-corruption that confuses any protocol for a specific function f that is "hard" to compute in linear communication. Our result do not apply to coding schemes with vanishing rate. In fact, if the communication is exponentially large, coding schemes with resilience higher than 1/5 exist. 6 Normally, we discuss the case where protocols compute a function f : X × Y → Z. While our converse bound on the resilience of interactive protocols works for some hard function (e.g., the pointer jumping), such a proof does not suffice towards our converse on the resilience of boolean circuits (Theorem 1.2). The reason is that the conversion between formulas to protocols does not yield a protocol that computes a function but rather a protocol that computes a relation. Recall that for any given function f and any input (x, y) such that f (x) = 0 and f (y) = 1, the KW-game for f , KW f , outputs an index i ∈ [n] for which x i = y i (see Section 6.1 for a formal definition). However, multiple such indices may exist and each such index is a valid output.
Let X, Y, Z be finite set and R ⊆ X × Y × Z be a ternary relation. For any (x, y) ∈ X × Y and a given relation R let R(x, y) = {z | (x, y, z) ∈ R} be the set of all z that satisfy the relation for x, y. Given such a relation, a protocol that computes the relation is the following two-party task. Alice is given x ∈ X and Bob is given y ∈ Y . The parties need to agree on some z ∈ R(x, y). We say that (x, y) is a valid input for R, if x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . We assume that for any valid input, |R(x, y)| > 0.
We now show an explicit relation for which no protocol (of "short"' length) is resilient to (1/5, 1/5) corruptions. Specifically, in the rest of this section we consider the binary parity function on n bits, par : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, defined for any x ∈ {0, 1} n by
be the KW-game for the parity function, defined by
Lemma 3.1. Let π be an interactive protocol of length |π| = r defined over a communication channel with alphabet Σ and noiseless feedback. Additionally, assume n ≥ r log |Σ| + 1. If π computes KW par then the following holds.
There exist inputs x, x ′ ∈ X, y, y ′ ∈ Y for which:
(1) π(x, y) and π(x, y ′ ) agree on the first 2r/5 rounds.
(2) During the first 2r/5 rounds of the execution π(x, y) Alice speaks fewer times than Bob.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that Alice is the party that speaks fewer times in the first 2r/5 rounds of π when averaging on all possible inputs (x, y) ∈ X × Y ; otherwise, a symmetric lemma holds for Bob. Let x be an input for Alice such that on most y's Alice speaks fewer times in the first 2n/5 rounds of π(x, y). Such an input must exist by our choice of Alice. Let
Be the set of all inputs for Bob, where Alice speaks fewer times in the first 2r/5 rounds of π assuming Alice holds the above x. By the choice of x, it holds that |Y ′ | ≥ 2 n /2. Consider the set of transcript prefixes of length 2r/5 generated by π when Alice holds the above x and Bob holds some input from the set Y ′ ,
Note that there are at most (2|Σ|) 2r/5 different prefixes of length 2r/5 over Σ with an arbitrary order of speaking. Since
by the pigeon-hole principle, there must be y, y ′ ∈ Y ′ such that π(x, y) and π(x, y ′ ) agree on the first 2r/5 rounds of the protocol-they have an identical order of speaking and they communicate the same information. Note that Properties (1) and (2) of the lemma are satisfied by the above x, y, y ′ . We are left to show an input x ′ for Alice that satisfies property (3). Based on the above x, y, y ′ we construct x ′ in the following manner. For any i ∈ [n] set
The above x ′ is constructed such that outputs given by KW par are disjoint if we change only the input of Alice or only the input of Bob. Formally, Claim 3.2. The following claims hold for the above
Since par(y) = par(y ′ ) = 1 then y, y ′ differ in an even number of indices (by considering y ⊕ y ′ = 0). This means that x ′ = x ⊕ z where the number of ones in z is even, thus,
are all bits and these two inequalities imply y i = y ′ i . But then, x ′ i = y i by the way we construct x ′ , which is a contradiction.
(c) Assume towards contradiction that i ∈ KW par (x ′ , y) ∩ KW par (x, y). That is, x ′ i = y i and x i = y i which means that x ′ i = x i . On the other hand, by the construction of x ′ , either
Both options lead to a contradiction. The proof of the second part is identical.
The first claim proves that x ′ is a valid input, i.e., x ′ ∈ X. The other claims prove property (3) of the lemma and conclude its proof.
Our main result in this section is the following Theorem, proving that no protocol for the KW par can be resilient to a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption if its communication is bounded. This will imply that any coding scheme that is resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-corruption must have rate 0. Specifically, it cannot produce a protocol with a constant overhead with respect to the optimal protocol that computes KW par over reliable channels. Theorem 3.3. Any interactive protocol π that computes the relation KW par by at most |π| < (n − 1)/ log |Σ| rounds over a noisy channel with alphabet Σ and noiseless feedback, is not resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions.
Proof. Let π be a protocol with r < (n − 1)/ log |Σ| rounds communicating symbols from the alphabet Σ. Via Lemma 3.1, let x 0 , x 1 ∈ X and y 0 , y 1 ∈ Y be inputs that satisfy
(1) π(x 0 , y 0 ) and π(x 0 , y 1 ) agree on the first 2r/5 rounds (2) During the first 2r/5 bits of the protocol π(x 0 , y 0 ) Alice speaks less than Bob.
We now generate a simulated transcript T and show that T is consistent with a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption of π(x 1 , y 0 ). Additionally, it is either the case that T is consistent with a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption of π(x 1 , y 1 ) or it is consistent with a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption of π(x 0 , y 0 ). In the first case, Alice is unable to distinguish the case where Bob holds y 0 and y 1 ; in the second, Bob cannot tell if Alice holds x 0 or x 1 . The outputs for different inputs are distinct by property (3). Thus the confused party is bound to err on at least one of them.
Note that the simulated transcript T contains messages received by the two parties, which may be noisy. Due to the feedback, both parties learn T . Additionally, the order of speaking in π is entirely determined by (prefixes of) T . Specifically, if two different instances of π have the same received transcript by round j, the party to speak in round j + 1 is identical in both instances.
The string T is obtained in the following manner:
1. Run π(x 0 , y 0 ) for 2r/5 rounds. Let T 1 be the generated transcript.
2. Run π(x 1 , y 0 | T 1 ) until Bob transmits r/5 additional symbols (unless π terminates beforehand). Let T 2 be the generated transcript.
until Bob transmits r/5 additional symbols (unless π terminates beforehand).
In case the above algorithm didn't execute Step i, for i ∈ {3, 4}, assume
We now show that T corresponds to a (1/5, 1/5)-corrupted execution of π for two different valid inputs with disjoint outputs. We consider two cases: (i) when Step 3 halts since T reached its maximal size of r symbols (i.e., when T 4 = ∅), and (ii) when Step 3 halts since Bob transmitted r/5 symbols in this step (T 4 = ∅).
In this case we show that a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption suffices to make the executions of π(x 1 , y 0 ) and π(x 1 , y 1 ) look the same from Alice's point of view.
Let Π be the transcript of a noisy execution of π(x 1 , y 0 ) (defined shortly) and split Π into three parts Π = Π 1 Π 2 Π 3 that correspond in length to T 1 , T 2 , T 3 . The noise changes all Alice transmissions in Π 1 so that they correspond to Alice's symbols in T 1 ; the noise changes all Bob's transmissions in Π 3 so that they correspond to Bob's transmissions in T 3 . It is easy to verify that the obtained transcript Π of received messages is exactly T . Furthermore, the first part changes at most r/5 transmissions by Alice, since by property (2) Alice speaks fewer times in the first 2r/5 of the instance π(x 0 , y 0 ). The second part changes at most r/5 transmissions of Bob since T 3 halts before Bob communicates additional r/5 transmissions. Hence the noise described above is a valid (1/5, 1/5)-corruption.
On the other hand, and abusing notations, consider a (noisy) instance of π(x 1 , y 1 ) and let Π = Π 1 Π 2 Π 3 be the received messages transcript split to parts that corresponds in length to T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , assuming the following noise. Again, the noise changes all Alice's transmissions in Π 1 to be the corresponding symbols received in T 1 . This makes the 2r/5 first rounds of the received transcript look as an instance π(x 0 , y 1 ). By Property (1), these transmissions agree with the first 2r/5 transmissions in the noiseless instance π(x 0 , y 0 ); hence, the corrupted Π 1 equals T 1 . Next, the noise changes Bob's transmissions in Π 2 to correspond to T 2 . The obtained transcript Π is then exactly T . Again, T 1 contains at most 2r/5 of Alice's transmissions, and T 2 contains at most r/5 transmissions of Bob by their definition. Hence, this is a valid (1/5, 1/5)-corruption.
We conclude by recalling that KW par (x 1 , y 0 ) ∩ KW par (x 1 , y 1 ) = ∅, then Alice must be wrong on at least one of the above executions, since her view in both executions is the same. Note that above proof holds even when T 3 = ∅.
case (ii) T 4 = ∅. In this case we show a (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions that makes the executions of π(x 0 , y 0 ) and π(x 1 , y 0 ) look the same from Bob's point of view. We point out that Alice speaks at most r/5 times after Step 1. Indeed, Step 1 contains 2r/5 rounds, and Steps 2-3 contain 2r/5 rounds where Bob speaks, hence Alice may speak in at most another r/5 times after Step 1.
Let Π be the transcript of a noisy execution of π(x 0 , y 0 ) where the noise is defined below. Split Π into 4 parts Π = Π 1 Π 2 Π 3 Π 4 that correspond in length to T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 . The noise changes all Alice's transmissions in Π 2 Π 3 Π 4 so that they match the corresponding symbols of T 2 , T 3 , T 4 . As mentioned, this corrupts at most r/5 symbols. Additionally, the noise changes Bob's transmissions in Π 3 to correspond to T 3 ; this by definition entails r/5 corruptions of Bob's transmissions. The obtained transcript Π is exactly T .
On the other hand, and abusing notations again, consider a noisy execution of π(
Here the noise is defined as follows. The noise changes all Alice's transmissions in Π 1 to match the corresponding symbols of T 1 . As before, the noise changes Bob's transmissions in Π 3 to match T 3 . Now it holds that Π = T , while the noise corrupted at most r/5 of each party's transmissions.
We conclude by recalling that KW par (x 0 , y 0 ) ∩ KW par (x 1 , y 0 ) = ∅. Thus, Bob must be wrong on at least one of the above executions, since his view in both executions is exactly the same.
Note that KW par has a protocol of length O(log n) assuming reliable channels. 7 Theorem 3.3 leads to the following conclusion.
Corollary 3.4. There exists an interactive protocol π 0 defined over a noiseless channel with feedback such that any protocol π that computes the same functionality as π 0 and is resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions (assuming noiseless feedback) must incur with an exponential blowup in the communication.
As a consequence, any coding scheme that compiles any protocol into a (1/5, 1/5)-resilient version, must have rate zero.
A Coding Scheme with Large Alphabet
In this section we construct a coding scheme for interactive protocols assuming a noiseless feedback. We show that for any constant ε > 0, any protocol π 0 defined over noiseless channels (with noiseless feedback) can be simulated by a protocol π = π ε defined over noisy channels (with noiseless feedback) such that (1) CC(π)/CC(π 0 ) = O ε (1), and (2) π is resilient to (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruptions. The protocol π in this section communicates symbols from a large alphabet of polynomial size in π 0 . In later sections we show how to reduce the size of the alphabet.
The coding scheme
On a high level, the coding scheme simulates π 0 step by step. The availability of a noiseless feedback channel allows a party to notice when the channel alters a transmission sent by that party. The next time that party speaks, it will re-transmit its message and "link" the new transmission to its latest uncorrupted transmission. That is, each message carries a "link"-a pointer to a previous message sent by the same party. By following the links, the receiver learns the "chain" of uncorrupted transmissions; the party considers all "off-chain" transmissions as corrupted.
The Parse procedure (in Algorithm 1) parses all the transmissions received so far and outputs the "current chain": the (rounds of the) transmissions linked by the latest received transmission. Note that once a new transmission arrives, the current chain possibly changes. Moreover, upon reception of a corrupt transmission, a corrupt chain may be retrieved.
The TempTranscript procedure determines the partial simulated transcript of π 0 according to messages received in π so far, i.e., according to the current chains. Again, the scheme considers only transmissions that are on-chain and ignore all off-chain transmissions. The partial simulated transcript is defined as the concatenation of all the messages that (a) were received uncorrupted and (b) that were generated according to the correct information.
To clarify this issue, consider round i where, without loss of generality, Alice sends the message m i . The latter property means that the last transmission received by Alice prior to round i, Prev(i) (see Definition 4.1), must be uncorrupted. This ensures that this ensures that Alice learns which transmissions (so far) are correct and which are not, in both directions (Lemma 4.3). It follows that Alice has full information about the on-going simulation of π 0 . In particular, she can generate the correct m i that extends the simulation of π 0 by one symbol. The former property ensures that m i itself, the correct extension of the simulation of π 0 , indeed arrives uncorrupted at the other side.
In each round of the protocol, the parties construct the partial transcript implied by messages received so far. If the received transmission is uncorrupt, the TempTranscript procedure retrieves the correct implied transcript (i.e., the implied transcript is indeed a prefix of the transcript of π 0 ). Then, the parties simulate the next rounds of π 0 assuming the implied partial transcript. As long as there is no noise in two alternating rounds, the next transmission extends the simulation of π 0 by one symbol. Otherwise, the sent symbol may be wrong, however, it will be ignored in future rounds once the chains indicate that this transmission was generated due to false information. Finally, at the end of the protocol, the parties output the transcript implied by the longest chain. The main part of this section is proving that the longest chain indeed implies a complete and correct simulation of π 0 .
An important property of the coding scheme is its adaptive order of speaking. The first 2n/5 rounds are alternating. On later rounds the order of speaking is determined according to observed noise: the more corrupted transmissions a party has, the less the party gets to speak. In particular, the protocol is split into epochs of 2 or 3 rounds each. In the first two rounds of an epoch, the order is fixed: Alice speaks in the first round and Bob speaks in the second. Then, the parties estimate the noise each party suffered so far (namely, the length of their current chain) and decide whether or not the epoch has a third round as well as who gets to speak in that extra round. For Alice to be the speaker in the third epoch-round, her current chain must be of length less than n/5 while Bob's current chain must be longer than n/5; Bob gets to speak if his chain is of length less than n/5 while Alice's chain is longer than n/5. In all other cases, the epoch contains only two rounds. We emphasize that due to the noiseless feedback, both parties agree on the received symbols (in both sides), which implies they agree on the current chains in both side, and thus, on the order of speaking in every epoch. The Next procedure, which determines the next speaker according to the current received transcript, captures the above idea.
The coding scheme is depicted in Algorithm 1. 1: Throughout the protocol, maintain S A , R A , R B , the sent, received by Alice, and received by Bob (as indicated by the feedback) symbols communicated up to the current round, respectively. 2: for i = 1 to n = |π 0 |/ε do 3:
⊲ Determine the next party to speak
if p next =Alice then
5:
T ←TempTranscript(S A , R A , R B )
6:
The next symbol σ = (link, b) to be communicated is: link is the latest non-corrupted round link < i where Alice is the speaker (j = 0 if no such round exists). 
Set T as the concatenation of all {b i } i∈GoodChain , where σ i = (link i , b i ) is the symbol received in round i.
26:
return T 27: end procedure subscript refers to the maximal round j < i where the speaker in round j differs from the speaker of round i.
It is easy to verify that Algorithm 1 is computationally efficient, as long as π 0 itself is efficient.
Lemma 4.1. For any constant ε > 0 and any π 0 given as a black-box, Algorithm 1 is computationally efficient in |π 0 |.
Proof. The algorithm runs n = O(|π 0 |) iterations, in each of which it needs to determine the next speaker, determine the partial transcript so far and determine the next message to send. The former two activities require performing Parse on all the symbols received by both parties; this takes O(n) time. Setting the next message requires a single activation of π 0 .
Good rounds and the implied transcript
Next, we show that when a transmission arrives correctly at the other side, the receiver learns all the uncorrupted transmissions communicated so far. First, let us define the notions of good rounds and implied transcript. We additionally set any round i ≤ 0 to be good (and uncorrupted) by definition. While the above GOOD and T (i) are tools for the analysis, the next lemma shows that whenever the i-th transmission arrives correctly at the other side, the receiver learns GOOD ≤i and T (i). Specifically, the variable GoodChain (Line 24) equals GOOD ≤i and TempTranscript outputs T (i). This allows us (despite some abuse of notations) to treat T (i) and the output of TempTranscript interchangeably, as long as i is uncorrupted. Remark 1. Assume round i is corrupted and let j < i be latest uncorrupted round. Then T (i) = T (j) which equals the output of TempTranscript in round j. However, the output of TempTranscript in round i may be arbitrary.
The next lemma argues that, if round i is uncorrupted, then the implied transcript T (i) (and hence the output of TempTranscript in round i) is indeed a correct (partial) simulation of π 0 .
Lemma 4.3. Assume that round i is uncorrupted. Then T (i) is a prefix of π 0 (x, y).
Proof. The proof goes by induction on i. The base case T (0) = ∅ is trivial. Assume that the claim holds for T (j) for any uncorrupted round j < i; we show that the same holds for round i.
Assume, without loss of generality, that Alice is the receiver in round i. Let j be the maximal previous round where Alice's transmission was not corrupted. Since round j is uncorrupted, Lemma 4.2 proves that, at round j, Bob learns GOOD ≤j and T (j). By the induction hypothesis, T (j) is a prefix of π 0 (x, y).
If j < Prev A (i) then i is not a good round, i / ∈ GOOD ≤i . It holds that GOOD ≤i = GOOD ≤j and T (i) = T (j), therefore, T (i) is indeed a prefix of π 0 (x, y). Otherwise, j = Prev A (i) and i is a good round. As said, in round j Bob learns T (j) (which is a correct prefix of π 0 (x, y)). Next, in round i it is Bob's turn to send the symbol σ i = (link i , b i ). If it is Bob's turn to speak in π 0 , then b i = π 0 (y | T (j)) will indeed be the correct continuation of T (j) according to π 0 ; otherwise Bob sends b i = ∅. In both cases, the channel does not corrupt σ i , Alice learns GOOD ≤i and the implied transcript she constructs equals T (i) = T (j) • b i . Hence, T (i) is indeed a prefix of π 0 (x, y).
Skipped rounds, the order of speaking and noise-progress tradeoffs
The order of speaking in the protocol depends on the observed noise measured through the length of the current chain. Whenever the current chain is shorter than n/5 for only one of the parties, this party "skips" one round of communication-the other party gets to speak in one additional round. We now define the skipping mechanism and use it to show that the coding scheme makes progress unless much noise has occurred. Note that an epoch can be both Alice-and Bob-skipped. Whenever an epoch is Alice-skipped, the counter SkipCnt A increases by one (Line 35) and Alice speaks only one time in that epoch. Similarly, in a Bob-skipped epoch, SkipCnt B increases by one and Bob speaks only once.
Next we prove some properties on the number of rounds each party gets to speak, as a function of the noise. In particular, we relate between the variables SkipCnt A , SkipCnt B to the number of rounds Alice and Bob get to speak, denoted RC A , RC B respectively. Proof. We split the protocol into the epochs generated by the Next procedure. For the i-th epoch denote n(i) ∈ {2, 3} the number of rounds in that epoch, and let A(i) (resp., B(i)) be an indicator which is 1 if the epoch is Alice-skipped (resp., Bob-skipped).
Note that Alice speaks in the i-th epoch exactly 
The case for Bob is symmetric.
Remark 2. In fact, due to rounding and the fact that Alice is the first to speak, she might get one extra round if the total number of rounds doesn't divide to full epochs, e.g., when the last epoch contains only a single round. A more accurate statement is RC A ≥ (n − SkipCnt A + SkipCnt B )/2 − 2 (and similarly for Bob). In order to ease the proof, we ignore this issue.
Next, we connect the number of skips with the amount of noise that happens during the first part of the protocol.
Claim 4.5. If t transmissions by Alice were corrupted during the 2n/5 first rounds, then at the end of the protocol, SkipCnt A ≥ n/5 + t.
Proof. During the first 2n/5 rounds, all the epochs are both Alice-and Bob-skipped (i.e., epochs of size 2). This means that by round i = 2n/5, SkipCnt A = n/5. Split rounds [2n/5 + 1, n] into epochs as done by the Next procedure; note that there are at least n/5 epochs in this part of the protocol. Since the noise corrupted t of Alice's transmissions before round 2n/5, it can corrupt at most n/5 − εn − t additional transmissions of Alice beyond round 2n/5.
That is, in at least n/5 − (n/5 − εn − t) = t + εn of the epochs after round 2n/5, Alice's transmission (in the first round of the epoch) is not corrupted; call these epochs Alice-uncorrupted. Note that by round 2n/5, Alice's "correct" chain is of length at most n/5 − t. As long as the length of Alice's correct chain is less than n/5, any Alice-uncorrupted epoch is also Alice-skipped. In each such epoch, SkipCnt A increases by one and Alice gets to speak only once. The length of Alice's correct chain also increases by one in each such epoch. It follows that in each of following t Alice-uncorrupted epochs, SkipCnt A increases until the length of the correct chain exceeds n/5 and the condition of line 35 does not hold any longer (for uncorrupted transmissions. Uncorrupted transmissions may increase SkipCnt A even further). Since the number of Alice-uncorrupted epochs is t + εn > t, the counter will indeed reach at least n/5 + t.
The following lemma captures a key property of our resilient protocol-a relation between the length of the simulated transcript and the number of corruptions occurred so far. Lemma 4.6. If, up to some round r, there were t Alice-skipped epochs where Alice's transmission is uncorrupted, and at most t − k corruptions in Bob's transmissions, then
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on k for all r ≥ t ≥ k.
The base case: k = 0, trivially holds since for all r, t, we have |T (r)| ≥ 0. For the inductive step, we assume that the lemma holds (for both parties) for some k and any r ≥ t ≥ k, and wish to show that it also holds for k + 1 and any r ≥ t ≥ k + 1. Specifically, let r, t where r ≥ t be fixed. We are given that by round r there are t Alice-skipped Alice-uncorrupted epochs, and that Bob's transmissions suffer from at most t − (k + 1) corruptions; we need to show that |T (r)| ≥ k + 1.
Since the number of corruptions at Bob's side by round r is less than t − k, the induction hypothesis tells us that there exists some round j ≤ r where |T (j)| ≥ k. Let j be the minimal round such that j ∈ GOOD and |T (j)| = k while |T (j − 1)| = k − 1. Recall that T extends only in good rounds (Definition 4.3), hence, such a round j must exist.
Assume there are t ′ Alice-skipped Alice-uncorrupted epochs until round j − 1. It follows that the number of corruptions at Bob's side (up to round j − 1) is at least t ′ − k + 1: if the number of corruptions is strictly less than t ′ − k + 1 then by induction T (j − 1) ≥ k contradicting the way we chose j. It follows that the number of corruption in Bob's transmissions for round [j, r] is at most
We now split into different cases. Assume Alice is the speaker in the j-th round. We know that j ∈ GOOD and |T (j)| > |T (j − 1)|. This implies that round (j − 1) is uncorrupted and that Bob is the next to speak in π 0 given T (j), due to the alternating nature of π 0 . Note that Alice has at least t − t ′ additional uncorrupted rounds within Alice-skipped epochs in rounds [j, r] (note that Alice speaks in round j, which is uncorrupt). In all these cases, either Bob speaks a single time immediately after Alice, or he speaks twice after Alice (Alice-skipped epoch). Since at most t−t ′ −2 of Bob's transmissions are corrupted, it follows that there must exist an uncorrupted round j ′ ∈ [j + 1, r] where Bob is the speaker and Prev A (j ′ ) is uncorrupted, i.e., j ′ ∈ GOOD. This implies that Bob sends the correct symbol that extends T in round j ′ , thus |T (j ′ )| = |T (j)| + 1 = k + 1. Since |T (·)| is non-decreasing, we proved the claim.
The other case is when Bob is the speaker in the j-th round. Again, j ∈ GOOD, since |T (j)| > |T (j − 1)|, thus, rounds j itself is uncorrupted. Then, in [j + 1, r] Alice has t − t ′ additional uncorrupted rounds (in Alice-skipped epochs) while at most t − t ′ − 2 of Bob's transmissions are corrupted. Similar to the previous case, after each one of the aforementioned Alice-skipped Aliceuncorrupted rounds, Bob either speaks once or twice. If we consider the previous (Prev B ) of these t − t ′ rounds of Alice, we know that at most t − t ′ − 2 of them can be corrupted (notice that round j itself belongs to Bob and is uncorrupted!). This means that there must exist a round j ′ ∈ [j + 1, r] where Alice is the speaker and Prev B (j ′ ) is uncorrupted, i.e., j ′ ∈ GOOD. Then, |T (j ′ )| = |T (j)| + 1 = k + 1 which completes this case.
An immediate corollary of the above lemma shows that the "correct" chain of the coding scheme fully simulates π 0 . Indeed, Claim 4.5 ensures that SkipCnt A ≥ n/5 by the end of the protocol. Furthermore, the corruption on Bob's side is bounded to (1/5 − ε)n. Lemma 4.6 then gives that
Yet, we still need to prove that the protocol outputs, in round n, a chain that contains T (n) as a prefix. In other words, we need to prove that the correct chain is a prefix of the longest chain. This is the goal of Section 4.3 below.
Another useful corollary of Lemma 4.6 is the following lemma that measures the progress in the first 2n/5 alternating rounds, as a function of the total amount of corruptions in that part. Proof. This is an immediate corollary of Lemma 4.6. Note that all the n/5 epochs up to round 2n/5 are both Alice-skipped and Bob-skipped epochs, and that the order of speaking is alternating. Assume that Alice has t uncorrupted rounds until round i, then Bob's transmissions suffer from at most (i/2 − k) − (i/2 − t) = t − k corruptions. Lemma 4.6 gives that T (i) ≥ k.
Resilience to (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruptions
In this part we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.8. For any ε > 0 and any binary alternating protocol π 0 , Algorithm 1 correctly simulates π 0 over a noisy channel with noiseless feedback and is resilient to any (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruption.
In the following we assume the noise is a (1/5−ε, 1/5−ε)-corruption, even if we do not explicitly say. As mentioned earlier, Algorithm 1 simulates the entire transcript of π 0 correctly in its good rounds. However, the parties cannot tell which are the good rounds. Instead, we show that the transcript implied by the longest chain contains the entire transcript of π 0 as its prefix.
Proposition 4.9. Assuming a (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruption, the longest chain at the end of the protocol implies the correct answer.
Towards proving this proposition let us set some notations and prove some technical lemmas. Consider a complete instance of the coding scheme of Algorithm 1. Let P A be the longest chain of Alice's transmissions as seen by Bob at the end of the protocol. Formally, P A = Parse(R Lemma 4.10. Let P A be the longest chain of Alice at the end of the protocol. Then,
Proof. In any uncorrupted round, Alice's transmission contains a link to the longest previous correct chain (Line 6), thus extending this chain by at least one link. These uncorrupted rounds where Alice is the speaker form a chain of length at least RC A − (1/5 − ε)n. The longest chain at the end of the protocol, P A , may only be longer.
Given a chain P A we differentiate between several types of Alice's rounds: (i) uncorrupted rounds that are on P A (denote these as the set N C A ); (ii) corrupted rounds that are on P A (denote these rounds as the set D); and (iii) corrupted rounds that are not on P A (denote these rounds as the set J).
Corollary 4.11.
Proof. Eq. (1) follows trivially from bounding the noise to a (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruption. Eq. (2) is an immediate corollary of Lemma 4.10 and Eq. (1), since
In a similar way we can define P B as the longest chain of Bob's transmissions as observed at the end of the protocol, and N C B as the set of uncorrupted rounds where Bob is the speaker and the rounds included in P B . We define w A , w B to be the number of corrupted transmissions in the first 2n/5 rounds (of Alice's transmissions and Bob's, respectively). Furthermore we distinguish between before and after round 2n/5 via a prime and double prime superscripts, respectively, i.e,
Lemma 4.12. Assuming the longest chain P A yields an incorrect output, it holds that
Proof. Assume the above equation doesn't hold, that is, N C ′
A − w B > εn. We prove that this means that the longest chain contains, as a prefix, a correct and complete simulation of π 0 .
Indeed, up to round 2n/5 there were at most n/5 − N C ′ A corruptions at Alice's side and w B corruptions at Bob's, with a total of n/5 − N C ′ A + w B < n/5 − εn. Lemma 4.7 implies that the progress up to round 2n/5 is at least εn, that is, |T (2n/5)| ≥ εn = |π 0 |. Since the entire transcript of π 0 is correctly simulated by the N C ′ A uncorrupted rounds, and these rounds are on the chain P A , it holds that the chain P A implies the correct answer, in contradiction to the lemma's statement.
We can now prove the main proposition, which also implies Theorem 4.8.
Proof. (Proposition 4.9) Assume towards contradiction that the longest chain P A does not imply the correct answer. We show that in this case we have N C A + (1/5 − ε)n − J < RC A − (1/5 − ε)n, or alternatively (via Lemma 4.4),
in contradiction to Corollary 4.11.
Claim 4.13.
Proof. Lemma 4.12 suggests that the number of corruptions in Bob's transmissions in the first 2n/5 rounds is w B ≥ N C ′ A − εn. Claim 4.5 then implies that SkipCnt B ≥ n/5 + w B ≥ n/5 + N C ′ A − εn. As for SkipCnt A , in the first 2n/5 it increases by n/5 trivially. Then, we can assume that every round in J ′′ increases SkipCnt A . For rounds in N C ′′ ∪ D ′′ , they can increase the counter only until the length of the chain reaches n/5, that is, at most n/5 − N C ′ A times. A bound on the counter is given by
With the above bounds on the skip-counters, the right-hand side of Eq. (3) is bounded by 
We obtained a contradiction for the second case as well. We are left to show that the assumption we took earlier holds, i.e., Claim 4.14.
Proof. If the claim does not hold, then there are n/5 Alice-skipped Alice-uncorrupted transmission on the chain that becomes the output. Since the number of Bob's corrupted transmissions is limited to n/5 − εn, Lemma 4.6 immediately gives that the length of the correct simulation of π 0 is at least εn = |π 0 |. This transcript is contained in the output chain and contradicts the assumption that the longest chain implies an incorrect output.
5 A Coding Scheme with a Constant-Size Alphabet
From large to constant alphabet: Overview
The coding scheme of Section 4 uses an alphabet of a polynomial size that can describe links to each of the n rounds of the protocol. We now show how to decrease the size of the alphabet to a constant. The main, and quite natural, idea is to encode each link using several symbols. Assume the alphabet Σ where each message is of size log |Σ| ≈ C 2 bits; C is some constant that may depend on ε, i.e., C = O ε (1). We split each message m ∈ Σ into the fields (link, type, msg) where, link ∈ {0, . . . , C}, type ∈ {std, start, stop, cont} and msg ∈ [C] ∪ {0, 1, ∅}. In order to link to a message which is at most C transmissions back, the link field can be used directly to contain a relative pointer. That is, link = 1 means the previous transmission, link = 2 means the second previous transmissions, etc. In this case, type = std and the msg field contains the payload-the bit b ∈ {0, 1} sent by the party according to π 0 (or msg = ∅ if the other party is to speak in π 0 ).
When the protocol needs to link to a transmission which is x > C transmissions back, we use a variable-length encoding of the relative pointer. Specifically, the coding begins with a message with type = start. Next, the value of x is encoded in the msg fields of the next log C x transmissions. In each such segment (except for the first one), the link field still points to the last uncorrupted transmission. The type field equals cont to denote this transmission is a (middle) fragment of the encoding. On the last fragment, type = stop denotes the end of the encoding.
A possible problem occurs when a party wishes to send an encoding of some (large) value x, however, during the transmission of this encoding many corruptions occur. Due to the noise, the link field of some specific segment of the encoding of x is too small to point to the previous segment. For concreteness, say the two segments are y > C transmissions apart. In this case, the above encoding acts recursively. That is, we initiate a new encoding (for y) by sending a message with type = start, whilst the encoding of x is still in progress. In the following transmissions, the msg fields contain the value y. After all the bits of y are transmitted, a message with type = stop indicates the end of y's encoding. Then, the encoding of x resumes from the point it stopped. Once all the fragments of x have communicated, a message with type = stop indicates the end of x's encoding, and the protocol continues as before.
This encoding does not harm the rate of the coding: most of the times the pointer is small enough and fits in a single link field with no further encoding (type = std). A burst of t > C consecutive corruptions causes the addition of ⌈log C t⌉ transmissions that describe a pointer to t transmissions beforehand. It is not too difficult to verify that n/C is a bound on the total added communication due to these encodings. We can the set C = 1/ε so that the added communication is bounded by εn transmissions.
These transmissions do not take part in the simulation of π 0 and can be considered as a "corruption" towards that goal (although they serve a critical role in generating the uncorrupted chain). We argue that the effect of these transmissions on the simulation of π 0 is at most as harmful as εn corrupted transmissions. It then follows that if the noise corrupts at most 1/5 − 2ε transmissions in each direction, the "effective" noise level (including transmissions used for encoding links) is bounded by 1/5 − ε, which is low enough to allow the correct simulation of π 0 .
A coding scheme with a constant-size alphabet
Towards a scheme with constant-size alphabet let us (re)define some of the basic elements we use. Let C = 1/ε be constant (without loss of generality, assume C is an integer). We define our alphabet to be Σ = {0, . . . , C} × {std, start, stop, cont)
Every m ∈ Σ is interpreted as m = (link, type, msg) where link points to a previous symbol m ′ unless type = start which indicates that the link to m ′ is encoded in the msg field of the next symbols. The type field indicates whether the encoding has completed (type = stop) or it still goes on (type = cont). We emphasize that whenever type = start the link field indeed points to the previous uncorrupted transmission. We let link = 0 indicate the first message in the chain (no previous message). For any m 1 , . . . , m t ∈ Σ, the "chain" of messages, Parse(m 1 , . . . , m t ), is determined by going over the chain link-by-link, until we hit the head of the chain (link = 0) or an encoded link (type = std). In this case we collect the fragments of the link (recursively, in case we hit another instance of encoding before we are done collecting all the fragments of the current encoding), decode them and continue parsing from the transmission pointed by the encoded value. The fragments that contain the encoding are omitted from the parsed output (so that the chain contains only the "real" messages of π 0 ). The Parse procedure is formally described in Algorithm 2.
The coding scheme with a constant-size alphabet is given in Algorithm 3. It is very similar to the coding scheme of Algorithm 1 except for the handling of encoded links, i.e., the encoding a far link and parsing a chain that contains encoded links.
Similar to Algorithm 1, the coding scheme of Algorithm 3 is clearly computationally-efficient. T emp ← m t 17:
while j is monotonically decreasing and j > 0 do
19:
if m j .type = cont then ⊲ continue collecting fragments
20:
T emp ← T emp ∪ {m j }
21:
j ← j − m j .link
22:
else if m j .type = start then ⊲ all fragments are collected; decode msg fields
23:
24:
return the value obtained by concatenating the msg fields in all the messages in T emp in the natural order.
25:
else if m j .type = stop then ⊲ recurse on inner encoding 26:
else if m j .type = std then ⊲ shouldn't happen whilst in encoding Without loss of generality, we assume log 2 C is an integer. The procedures Next and TempTranscript are as described in Alrogithm 1.
1: Throughout the protocol, maintain S A , R A , R B , the sent, received by Alice and received by Bob (as indicated by the feedback) symbols communicated up to the current round, respectively. 2: msgStack ← ∅. 3: for i = 1 to n = |π 0 |/ε do 4:
5:
if p next =Alice then 6:
Let lastMsg be the offset to the latest uncorrupted round where Alice is the speaker.
8:
Alice is the sender in π 0 , otherwise (or if π 0 has terminated) b = ∅.
9:
if lastM sg > C then ⊲ Encode link using multiple segments
10:
Write lastMsg as a binary string s = s 1 s 2 · · · s t where ∀i, |s i | = log C 11:
end if (receive a symbol from Bob)
24:
end if 25: end for
Analysis
Lemma 5.2. Let E denote the set of all the rounds where the transmission is uncorrupted and has type = std (i.e., is a part of an encoding). Then
|E| ≤ εn
Proof. Any burst of t > C corruptions causes at most ⌈log C t⌉ uncorrupted transmissions with type = std, that encode a link to t transmissions back. Due to the recursive manner of the encoding, a later burst of corruptions has no effect on the encoding of previous links, it only delays the rounds in which the first encoding is transmitted by the amount of rounds needed to encode the link that comes after the later burst. In other words, a burst of t corruption followed by a burst of t ′ corruptions cause at most ⌈log C t⌉ + ⌈log C t ′ ⌉ rounds with type = std. Since the total number of corrupted rounds (per party) is bounded by (1/5 − ε)n, then the total encodings length (for that party) is bounded by n/C.
Partition E into E A , E B , the encoding rounds at Alice and Bob side, respectively. Assume that the noise pattern on Alice's transmission is composed of bursts of lengths t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k where for every i we have |t i | > C (otherwise t i doesn't add any transmissions with type = std). Note that the above requirement implies that k < n/5C.
where the first inequality follows from Jensen's inequality. E B is bounded by the same value. The above function monotonically increases in [0, n/5]. The number of messages with type = std is then upper bounded by the value of the function at k = n/5C,
We now prove that Algorithm 3 simulates π 0 correctly as long as the corruption level is below 1/5. The idea is to reduce Algorithm 3 to Algorithm 1. This is done by considering fragments of encoding as "corrupted" transmissions of Algorithm 1, while still obtaining the correct link from these encoded transmissions. Since the number of transmissions used for encodings is at most εn, they "increase" the effective noise level by this small amount, which is still tolerable by Algorithm 1.
Theorem 5.3. Algorithm 3 is resilient to any (1/5 − 2ε, 1/5 − 2ε)-corruption.
Proof. Algorithm 3 differs from Algorithm 1 in one main aspect-rounds in which type ∈ {start, cont, stop}. Other than those rounds, the two algorithms behave exactly the same: given a similar transcript m 1 , . . . , m t for which type = std, they both generate exactly the same partial transcript, the same next message, and the same next speaker.
We can interpret any instance of Algorithm 3 as an instance of Algorithm 1 in which transmissions with type = std correspond to "erased" transmissions in Algorithm 1: transmissions whose "link" part is invalid (hence, the parsed chain is empty). Formally, there exists a transformation that takes any transcript m = m 1 , . . . , m n generated by Algorithm 3 on the input x, y assuming a (1/5 − 2ε, 1/5 − 2ε)-corruption, and generates a transcript m ′ = m ′ 1 , . . . , m ′ n such that 1. m ′ is an instance of Algorithm 1 on the input x, y that suffers from a (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruption.
2. For any i ∈ [n], the parsed chain in both algorithms is the same, Parse
The transformation is as follows: if m i .type = std and m i .link points to a message m j with EffectiveAddress(m 1 , . . . , m j ) . Other cases are irrelevant (m ′ i will be attributed to a corruption).
That is, the transmissions contain (logically,) the same message and same link except for transmissions that contain links in m. These correspond to corrupted transmissions in m ′ . However in every round i where m i links to the end of an encoded link (m j ), we set the link in m ′ i to EffectiveAddress(m 1 , . . . , m j ), i.e., to the last non-encoding uncorrupted transmission prior to m i .
Item 2 holds by induction. Assume that for the claim holds for all rounds up to i. Since both algorithms generate the same parsed chain, they make identical decisions regarding the order of speaking and the identity of the next speaker. If the (i + 1)-th transmission in m links to a transmission more than C steps back, or if m i+1 = std then m ′ i+1 is assumed to be corrupted. In this case it holds that Parse(m 1 , . . . , As a consequence of Item 2, the parsed chains, and hence the implied transcripts are identical between the two instances for any i ∈ [n]. Therefore, for any round i, the transmission generated by Algorithm 1 given m ′ 1 , . . . , m ′ i−1 equals m ′ i defined by the above transformation, except for two cases: when m i is corrupted and when m i is an encoding (m i .type = std). Lemma 5.2 bounds the number of encoded transmissions by εn. Hence, any instance with a (1/5 − 2ε, 1/5 − 2ε)-corruption in Algorithm 3 translates to an instance of Algorithm 1 with a (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruption.
The correctness of the Algorithm 3 follows from the correctness of the Algorithm 1.
Applications for Circuits with Short-Circuit Noise
In this section, we prove our main theorems (Theorems 1.1 and 1.2). We show that the KWtransformation between formulas and protocols (and vice versa) extends to the noisy setting in a manner that preserves noise-resilience. Applying the results of Sections 4-5 onto the realm of boolean formulas gives a construction of formulas resilient to an optimal level of a fraction (1/5 − ε) of short-circuit gates in any input-to-output path. Additionally, the results of Section 3 imply that noise-resilience of 1/5 is maximal for formulas (assuming polynomial overhead).
In the following subsections, we show how to convert between formulas and protocols without affecting the noise-resilience. If we start with a formula that is resilient to (α, β)-corruptions, our transformation yields a protocol resilient to (α, β)-corruptions (Proposition 6.7). Moreover, given a protocol resilient to (α, β)-corruptions, the transformation yields a formula which is resilient to a similar level of noise (Proposition 6.11).
Preliminaries
Formulas A formula F (z) over n-bit inputs z ∈ {0, 1} n is a k-ary tree where each node is a {∧, ∨} gate with fan-in k and fan-out 1. [While our results apply to any k, in this section we will usually assume k = 2 for simplicity.] Each leaf is a literal (either z i or ¬z i ). The value of a node v given the input z ∈ {0, 1}, denoted v(z) ∈ {0, 1}, is computed in a recursive manner: the value of a leaf is the value of the literal (given the specific input z); the value of an ∧ gate is the boolean AND of the values of its k descendants,
The output of the formula on z, F (z), is the value of the root node. We say that F computes the function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} if for any z ∈ {0, 1} n it holds that F (z) = f (z).
The depth of a formula, denoted depth(F ), is the longest root-to-leaf path in it. The size of a formula, denoted |F |, is the number of nodes it contains. We denote by V ∧ the set of all the ∧ nodes, and by V ∨ the set of all the ∨ nodes.
Karchmer-Wigderson Games
For any boolean function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, the KarchmerWigderson game is the following interactive task. Alice is given an input x ∈ f −1 (0) and Bob gets y ∈ f −1 (1). Their task is to find an index i ∈ [n] such that x i = y i . We are guaranteed that such an index exists since f (x) = 0 while f (y) = 1. We denote the above task by KW f .
Karchmer and Wigderson [KW90] proved the following relation between formulas and protocols.
Theorem 6.1 ( [KW90] ). For any function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, the depth of the optimal formula for f equals the length of the optimal interactive protocol for KW f .
The above theorem is proven by showing a conversion between a formula for f and a protocol for KW f , which we term the KW-transformation. In this conversion, the formula-tree is converted into a protocol tree, where every ∧ gate becomes a node where Alice speaks and every ∨ gate becomes a node where Bob speaks. For a node v, the mapping a v : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} is set as follows. For a given input z, consider the evaluation of the formula F on z. The node v is an ∧ gate and we can write v(z) = v 0 (z) ∧ v 1 (z) where v 0 and v 1 are v's left and right descendants, respectively. If v 0 (z) = 0 we set a v (z) = 0; otherwise we set a v (z) = 1. For an ∨ gate denote v(z) = v 0 (z) ∨ v 1 (z), and b v (z) = 0 if v 0 (z) = 1; otherwise b v (z) = 1. If the protocol reaches a leaf which is marked with the literal z i or ¬z i , it outputs i. For technical reasons we will assume that the protocol outputs either z i or ¬z i rather than just giving the index i. Note that the literal always evaluates to the value of f ; In this work a KW f protocol must satisfy this additional requirement.
It is easy to verify that the following invariant holds: for every node v reached by the protocol on some input (x, y) ∈ f −1 (0) × f −1 (1), it holds that v(x) = 0 while v(y) = 1. This holds for the root node by definition, and our selection of mappings a v , b v maintains this property. Specifically, for an ∧ gate v for which v(x) = 0 it must hold that at least one of the gate's inputs is zero. Indeed, the way we chose a v advances the protocol to a child node that evaluates to 0. Since v(y) = 1 then both children of v evaluate to 1 on y, thus both descendants satisfy the invariant. The analysis for an ∨ gate is symmetric. It follows that once the protocol reaches a leaf (the literal z i or ¬z i ), that literal evaluates differently on x and on y, so x i = y i as required. In particular, the literal evaluates to 0 on x and to 1 on y.
The same reasoning allows us to convert a protocol for KW f into a formula for f : consider the protocol tree and convert each node where Alice speaks to an ∧ gate and each node where Bob speaks to an ∨ gate. If the protocol outputs z i or ¬z i at some leaf, that literal is assigned to that leaf.
Proving that this conversion yields a formula for f is shown by induction on the length of the protocol. If |KW f | = 0, then the protocol outputs (say) z i without communicating. It is clear that all inputs in the domain satisfy x i = y i , and that x i = 0 while y i = 1 (negate these values if the output of the protocol is ¬z i ). For the induction step, assume without loss of generality that Alice is to speak first. For some partition X 0 ∪ X 1 = f −1 (0), Alice sends 0 when x ∈ X 0 and otherwise she sends 1. By induction, the continuation of the protocol can be converted into formulas F 0 and F 1 (corresponding to the case where Alice sends 0 and 1, respectively), for which F 0 (x) = 0 when x ∈ X 0 , F 1 (x) = 0 when x ∈ X 1 , and F 0 (y) = F 1 (y) = 1 when y ∈ f −1 (1). Taking F = F 0 ∧ F 1 completes the proof. The other case, where Bob is to speak first is symmetric. See [KW90] for further details about the KW-transformation from formulas to protocols and vice versa, and for the formal proofs.
Remark 3. In the above, formulas are assumed to have fan-in 2 and protocols are assumed to communicate bits. However, the same reasoning and conversion applies also for a more general case, where each ∧, ∨ gate has fan-in k, and the protocol sends symbols from alphabet of size |Σ| = k.
Furthermore, while our claims below are stated and proved assuming fan-in 2, all our claims apply to any arbitrary fan-in k.
Short-Circuit Noise A short circuit noise replaces the value of a specific node with the value of one of its descendants. A noise pattern E ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1, * } |V∧|∪|V∨| defines for each node whether it is short-circuited and to which input. Specifically, if for some node v, E v = * then the gate is not corrupted and it behaves as defined above. Otherwise, the value of the node is the value of its E v -th descendant, v(z) = v Ev (z). We denote by F E the formula with short circuit pattern E; we sometime write F for the formula with no short-circuit noise, i.e. with the noise pattern E = * |V∧|∪|V∨| .
We say that a circuit is resilient to a noise pattern E if for any z ∈ {0, 1} n it holds that F (z) = F E (z).
Definition 6.1. We say that F is resilient to δ-fraction of noise if it is resilient to all noise patterns E in which the fraction of corrupted gates in any input-to-output path in F is at most δ.
We can also be more delicate and distinguish between noise in ∧-gates and ∨-gates.
Definition 6.2. An (α, β)-corruption of short-circuit errors, is a noise pattern on a formula F of depth n that changes at most αn ∧-gates and at most βn ∨-gates in any input-to-output path in F .
The following is immediate by definition.
Claim 6.2. If, for some δ > 0, the formula F is resilient to any (δ, δ)-corruption of short-circuit errors, then F is also resilient to δ-fraction of noise.
On its surface, the other direction does not necessarily hold: (δ, δ)-corruption may corrupt up to a fraction 2δ of the gates in each path, hence resilience to δ-fraction appears to be insufficient to resist all (δ, δ)-corruptions. Nevertheless, we argue that these two notions are indeed equivalent. The reason is that a short-circuit in an ∧-gate can only turn the output from 0 to 1. A short-circuit in an ∨-gate can only turn the output from 1 to 0. Then, if a formula evaluates to 1 on some input, the output remains 1 regardless of any amount of short-circuited ∧-gates. If the output is 0, it remains so regardless of any number of short-circuited ∨-gates. This observation was already made by Kalai et al. [KLR12] . Claim 7] ). Let F be a formula, z an input and E any error pattern. Let E ∧ be the error pattern induced by E on the ∧ gates alone (no errors in ∨ gates); Let E ∨ be the error pattern induced by E on the ∨ gates alone. It holds that if F E∧ (z) = 0, then F E (z) = 0 and if F E∨ (z) = 1 then F E (z) = 1.
The above lemma then implies that resilience to δ-fraction of noise corresponds to resilience to the same fraction of noise in both type of gates.
Lemma 6.4. If, for some δ > 0, the formula F is resilient to a fraction δ of short-circuit noise, then F is also resilient to any (δ, δ)-corruption.
Proof. Assume F has depth n and consider any inputs x, y such that F (x) = 0 and F (y) = 1.
Let E be an arbitrary (δ, δ)-corruption pattern. In particular, E short-circuits up to δn of the ∧-gates and additionally up to δn of the ∨-gates in any input-to-output path. Let E ∧ be the error pattern induced by E on the ∧ gates alone and let E ∨ be the error pattern induced by E on the ∨ gates alone. Note that both the noise patterns E ∨ and E ∧ corrupt at most δ-fraction of the gates in each path.
Since F is resilient to δ-fraction of noise, we have
Lemma 6.3 and Eq. (5) then imply that F E (x) = 0. Similarly, the lemma and Eq. (6) imply that F E (y) = 1. Since the above holds for an arbitrary (δ, δ)-corruption E and for all inputs x, y, we get that F is resilient to (δ, δ)-corruptions.
Following the mapping between formulas and protocols, [KLR12] made the observations that a short-circuit error in a formula translates to channel noise in the equivalent KW protocol, assuming both parties learn the noise, i.e., assuming noiseless feedback. We will sometimes abuse notations and identify a short-circuit noise pattern with a transmission noise pattern for a formula F and a protocol π that share the same underlying tree structure. Furthermore, we will denote the two different objects with the same identifier E.
From Formulas to Protocols
We begin with a KW-transformation for noisy formulas, given a specific noise pattern.
Definition 6.3 (Noisy KW-transformation). For any formula F (z) and any noise pattern E for F , the noisy transformation of F E yields an interactive protocol π F E defined as follows over the domain F −1
• The formula-tree is converted into a protocol tree, where every ∧ gate becomes a node where Alice speaks and every ∨ gate becomes a node where Bob speaks.
• For a node v, the mapping a v (z) for z ∈ F • A leaf of F marked with the literal z i or ¬z i becomes a leaf (output) of the protocol with the same literal.
Remark 4. In the above definition, we assume that if both v 0 (z) = 0 and v 1 (z) = 0 (for z ∈ F −1 (0)), the protocol continues to the left child. This choice is arbitrary, and any other choice is valid and gives an alternative protocol which still satisfies Proposition 6.5 and Corollary 6.6 below.
For instance, we can have non-intersecting sets Z 0 and Z 1 that determine the inputs z for which we take the left or right child, respectively (assuming both subformulas evaluate to 0 exactly on Z 0 ∪ Z 1 ).
Proposition 6.5. For any formula F (z) and any noise pattern E for F , consider the noisy formula F E (z) and the protocol π F E obtained by performing the noisy KW-transformation of Definition 6.3.
Given any instance of π F E on inputs (x, y) ∈ F −1
E (1) along with the noise induced on the protocol by E, it holds that any node v in the protocol tree reached by that instance maintains that v(x) = 0 and v(y) = 1 in F E .
Proof. Denote the noisy instance of the protocol by π There are two cases according to the noise associated with the top gate. If there is no noise at v, E v = * , then for any input z it holds that v(z) = F E0 (z) ∧ F E1 (z), where F E0 , F E1 are the noisy subformulas of F E rooted at v 0 and v 1 respectively. 8 Since F E (y) = v(y) = 1 it must hold that F E0 (y) = F E1 (y) = 1. Additionally, F E (x) = v(x) = 0 therefore at least one of F E0 (x) and F E1 (x) must be 0. The protocol Π F E E proceeds to the left child if F E0 (x) = 0, or to the right child otherwise. By the induction hypothesis, the claim holds for the depth d − 1 subprotocol that corresponds to the (noisy) sub-formula F E0 or F E1 accordingly.
If there is noise at v, without loss of generality, E v = 0, then v(z) = F E0 (z). It follows that F E (z) = F E0 (z), and specifically, F E0 (x) = 0 while F E0 (y) = 1. Note that in the protocol π F E E , the noise at node v dictates that the parties continue to node v 0 regardless to Alice's input and transmission 9 . By the induction hypothesis the claim holds for the depth d − 1 subprotocol that corresponds to the noisy sub-formula F E0 rooted at v 0 .
Corollary 6.6. Assume that F E (z) computes the function f (z). Then, π
Proof. Say that on inputs (x, y) ∈ F −1
E (1) the protocol terminates at a leaf v marked with either z i or ¬z i . By the above Proposition 6.5 it holds that v(x) = 0 while v(y) = 1, which implies that x i = y i . Note that the literal evaluates to the output of the function as we additionally require from KW f protocols.
With the above we can show our main proposition for converting formulas to protocols in a noise-preserving way.
Proposition 6.7. Let F be a (complete) formula that computes the function f and is resilient to (α, β)-corruption of short-circuit gates in every input-to-output path. Then, a noisy KWtransformation yields a protocol π (over channels with feedback) that solves KW f and is resilient to (α, β)-corruptions.
Proof. We convert F into the protocol π defined for inputs (x, y) ∈ F −1 (0)×F −1 (1) in the following manner. The conversion is performed similar to the noisy KW-transformation (Definition 6.3), however the mappings a v , b v are set in a specific way we now describe.
Order the nodes in the protocol tree in a BFS order starting from the root, and determine the mappings associated with each node in that order (i.e., before setting the mapping of some node, set the mapping of all its ancestors). Assume we wish to set the mapping of a node v. Let S (v,x,y) be the set of noise patterns E such that E is a (α, β)-corruptions and such that an instance of π given the input (x, y) and noise E causes the protocol to reach the node v (note that this process is well defined due to the BFS order).
If v is an ∧ node, for any x, the mapping a v (x) maps to the child w for which the subformula of F rooted at w evaluates to 0 on x for all noise patterns E ∈ y ′ ∈F −1 (1) S (v,x,y ′ ) . If v is an ∨ node, then for any y, the map b v (y) maps to the child w for which the subformula of F rooted at w evaluates to 1 on y for all noise patterns E ∈ x ′ ∈F −1 (0) S (v,x ′ ,y) . Note that the mappings may be partial functions, specifically, if an ∧ node v is not reachable for the input x with any y's and any valid noise, then there is no meaning to define a v on the input x. Claim 6.8 below guarantees that for any reachable node v we can always find a child w that satisfies the above condition.
We now prove that the protocol π is resilient to any noise pattern induced by some (α, β)-corruption pattern E. Let E be a given (α, β)-corruption, and let π E be the protocol defined above for F assuming the transmission noise induced by E. We claim that the protocol π E computes KW F E = KW f , which means that π is resilient to the noise E.
Consider the noisy formula F E and its corresponding interactive protocol π F E given by the noisy KW-transformation (Definition 6.3). As mentioned in Remark 4 we can make it so the mapping at any reachable node in π F E where there is a choice whether to go to the left child or the right child, takes the same choice that π does. 10 Then, all the reachable nodes in π F E E behave exactly the same 9 Alice is aware of the noise through the feedback, thus she can follow the progress of protocol as defined above. This shows that a noiseless feedback setting is critical when transforming formulas that suffer from short-circuit noise.
10 π and π F E share the same underlying protocol tree structure, so for each node in one protocol there exists a corresponding node in the other protocol, which is owned by the same party. Hence, we can set the mappings av and bv of one protocol via the corresponding mappings of the other one.
as in π E : say that on input x ∈ F −1 E (0) we reach a node v in π F E E and there is no choice for the next node (e.g., v 0 (x) = 0 while v 1 (x) = 1, so we must continue with v 0 ) then also there is no choice in π, since v 1 does not evaluate to 0 with all errors (specifically, it does not evaluate to 0 on x with the noise E!); however if there is a choice in π F E E , the protocol continues exactly as π. For any input (x, y) ∈ F −1
E (1) the protocols π E and π F E E advance exactly the same: they begin at the root; if they are at node v where E v = * they both advance to the node dictated by E v ; Otherwise, they both advance to the same node since their mapping (either a v (x) or b v (y)) is exactly the same at that node. Hence, both protocols reach the same leaf and compute the same function for any input (x, y) ∈ F −1
(1) (recall that F is resilient to the noise E). Then, Corollary 6.6 implies that π E computes KW F E = KW f . Therefore, π is resilient to the noise E. Note that this claim holds for any (α, β)-corruption E, which completes the proof.
We are left to prove the following technical claim used in the above proof.
Claim 6.8. For any node v reached by the construction in Theorem 6.7, and for any x, y such that π constructed up to that point reaches v on x, y and some valid noise, the following holds.
Let F 0 and F 1 be the subformulas (of F ) rooted at the left and right child of v, respectively. There is at least one subformula G ∈ {F 0 , F 1 } that satisfies G E (x) = 0 for all noise patterns E ∈ y ′ ∈F −1 (1) S (v,x,y ′ ) (when v is an ∧ node), or G E (y) = 1 for all noise patterns E ∈ x ′ ∈F −1 (0) S (v,x ′ ,y) (when v is an ∨ node).
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the nodes v given by the BFS ordering. The base case is when v is the root. The proof for the root node is a simple special case of the proof given below for an arbitrary v.
Let v be given and assume that the claim holds for all nodes v ′ that come before v in the BFS ordering. Specifically, it holds for all the ancestors of v. We show that the claim holds for v as well. Consider the case where v is an ∧ node (the other case is similar). First note that for any noise E and inputs (x, y) for which (the partially constructed) π E (x, y) reaches v it holds that v(x) = 0 and v(y) = 1 in F E . This is given by the way we constructed π so far: it holds for the root node since F E (x) = 0, F E (y) = 1, and it is maintained throughout the route to v by π's definition (given that the claim inductively holds for all the ancestors of v).
Assume towards contradiction that the claim does not hold for v. That is, there are two noise patterns E 0 , E 1 ∈ y ′ ∈F −1 (1) S (v,x,y ′ ) such that (F 0 ) E 0 (x) = 1 and (F 1 ) E 1 (x) = 1.
Define the noise pattern E * (over the nodes of F ) in the following way. For any ancestor of v, E * is defined exactly as the ∨-minimal between E 0 and E 1 , i.e., the one that induces the least noise on ∨-gates in the root-to-v path. Furthermore, for any ∧ gate u in the root-to-v path, if either E 0 or E 1 contains no noise at u, set E * to have no noise at that gate. Otherwise, both E 0 and E 1 have noise at u and since both reach v, the noise must be the same; in this case E * contains the same noise for u as E 0 and E 1 . For the nodes that belong to the subformula F 0 , the noise E * is identical to E 0 , and for nodes that belong to the subformula F 1 , E * is identical to E 1 . In all other nodes there is no noise in E * .
Clearly by this construction, E * is an (α, β)-corruption, since compared to either E 0 or E 1 , we only reduced the amount of corruptions in both ∧ and ∨ gates between the root and v (and kept the same number of corruptions below v). Furthermore, there must exist some y ′ such that π E * (x, y ′ ) reaches v: Assume E 0 was the ∨-minimal. Since E 0 ∈ y ′ ∈F −1 (1) S (v,x,y ′ ) there exists y ′ for which π E 0 (x, y ′ ) reaches v. We argue that π E * (x, y ′ ) also reaches v. Indeed, in any ∨-gate π E * (x, y ′ ) behaves exactly like π E 0 (x, y ′ ) since the noise in both is identical. For any ∧-gate u it may be that E 0 has noise in u while E 1 (and thus, E * ) does not. However, there exists y ′′ such that π E 1 (x, y ′′ ) reaches v. Hence, it also reaches u, and it also advances to the same child as π E 0 (x, y ′ ) does when it reaches u. Since u is an ∧-gate, this decision depend only on x. By the above we learn that if the protocol reaches u and there is no noise, it advances to the same child determined by the noise E 0 at u. Therefore, π E * (x, y ′ ) takes the same child of u as π E 0 (x, y ′ ). It follows that π E * (x, y ′ ) reaches v, and E * ∈ y ′ ∈F −1 (1) S (v,x,y ′ ) .
Additionally, in F E * , the node v evaluates to 1 on x, because (F 0 ) E * (x) = (F 0 ) E 0 (x) = 1 and (F 1 ) E * (x) = (F 1 ) E 1 (x) = 1. But this contradicts the property, asserted at the beginning of this proof, that for any noise E (and specifically for E * ), any node v that is reachable by π E * (x, y ′ ) must evaluate to 0 on x. Therefore, at least one of F 0 (x) and F 1 (x) evaluates to 0 on all noise patterns in scope.
The conversion from resilient formulas into resilient protocols of Proposition 6.7 implies an upper bound on the maximal resilience of formulas, and proves Theorem 1.2.
Theorem 6.9. There exists a function f : {0, 1} n → Z such that no formula F that computes f with fan-in k and depth less than (n − 1)/k, is resilient to a fraction 1/5 of short-circuit noise.
Proof. For z ∈ {0, 1} n , let par(z) = z 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ z n be the parity function.
Let F be a formula that computes par(z) with AND/OR gates of fan-in k and depth depth(F ) < (n − 1)/k. Assume that F is resilient to a fraction 1/5 of short-circuit noise. Lemma 6.4 shows that F is also resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions of short-circuits. Moreover, assume that the formula's underlying graph is a complete k-ary tree. 11 Then, using Proposition 6.7 we obtain an interactive protocol π for KW par of length |π| = depth(F ) < (n − 1)/k that communicates symbol from alphabet of size |Σ| = k, and resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions. This contradicts Theorem 3.3.
Note that computing the parity of n bits can be done with a formula of depth O(log n). However, the above theorem shows that any resilient formula for the parity function will have an exponential blow-up in depth, and thus exponential blow-up in size.
Corollary 6.10. There is no coding scheme that converts any formula F of size s into a formula F ′ of size o(exp(s)), such that F ′ computes the same function as F and is resilient to 1/5-fraction of short-circuit gates on every input to output path.
From Protocols to Formulas
Here we would like to prove that a resilient protocol implies a resilient formula.
Proposition 6.11. Let π be a protocol that solves KW f for some function f and is resilient to (α, β)-corruption. The KW-transformation on the reachable protocol tree of π yields a formula F that computes f and is resilient to (α, β)-corruption of short-circuit noise in any of its input-tooutput paths.
The above proposition is in fact a reformulation of a result by result Kalai, Lewko, and Rao [KLR12] , implied by Lemma 6.3 and the following.
Lemma 6.12 ([KLR12, Lemma 8]). Let f be a boolean function, and let π be a protocol with root p root . Let T ⊂ f −1 (0) × ([k] ∪ { * }) V A and U ⊂ f −1 (1) × ([k] ∪ { * }) V B be two nonempty sets such that the protocol π solves KW f on every pair of inputs and noise in T × U , and assume any vertex that is a descendent of p root can be reached using some input and noise from T × U .
Then there is a formula F that is obtained by replacing every vertex where Alice speaks with an ∧ gate, every vertex where Bob speaks with an ∨ gate and every leaf with a literal, such that for every (x, E A ) ∈ T , (y, E B ) ∈ U it holds that F E∧ (x) = 0 and F E∨ (y) = 1, where E ∧ is E A on Alice's vertices and * on Bob's vertices; E ∨ is * on Alice's vertices and E B on Bob's vertices.
Using our coding scheme that is resilient to (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruptions (Algorithm 3) we get that we can fortify any formula F so it becomes resilient to (1/5 − ε)-fraction of short-circuit noise, with only polynomial growth in size.
Theorem 6.13. For any ε > 0, any formula F of depth n and fan-in 2 that computes a function f can be efficiently converted into a formulas F ′ that computes f even up to 1/5−ε of the gates in any of its input-to-output path are short-circuited. F ′ has a constant fan-in O ε (1) and depth O(n/ε).
Proof. The conversion is done in the following manner. Given a formula F (that computes some function f ) we first balance it, i.e., convert it to an equivalent formulaF of depth log |F | with no redundant branches. It is well known that such a formula always exists. Next, we convertF into a protocol π for KW f via the KW-transformation (Section 6.1); note that the length of π is at most the depth ofF , that is, O(log |F |). Then, we convert π into a protocol π ′ that solves the same function KW f and is resilient to (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruptions, assuming noiseless feedback. This step is possible due to Theorem 5.3. The resilient π ′ is then transformed back into the resilient formula F ′ that satisfies the theorem assertions, using Proposition 6.11. Recall that the depth of the obtained formula is exactly the length of the resilient protocol.
To complete the proof we only need to argue that the conversion can be done efficiently. It is easy to verify that convertingF to π is efficient, and also converting π to π ′ (Algorithm 3) is efficient by Lemma 5.1. The only part which is possibly inefficient is the reverse KW-transformation from π ′ back to a formula, which requires finding the reachable protocol tree of π ′ -the vertices v for which there exists an input (x, y) and a (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruption E such that π ′ (x, y) reaches v if the noise is E. This part is can be shown to be efficient in by a technique similar to [KLR12] . In Appendix A we give a detailed proof. Theorem 1.1 is an immediate corollary of the above theorem, by noting that
O(log(1/ε)) O((log |F |)/ε) = poly ε (|F |).
Here k ≈ ε −2 is the fan-in of |F ′ | given by the alphabet size of the resilient interactive protocol π ′ constructed earlier.
Given a node v of depth h ≤ |π ′ | in the protocol tree of π ′ , we say that v is Φ-reachable if there exist input (x, y) and noise pattern E ∈ Φ such that π(x, y) reaches v when the noise is E. The Φ-reachable protocol tree of π ′ are all the nodes of depth at most |π ′ | that are Φ-reachable.
Recall that |π| = log |F | and that |π ′ | = O ε (|π|); set d = |π ′ |. In the following, "efficiently" means time complexity of poly(2 d ) = poly(|F |). The idea behind the algorithm is as follows. Given v let (v 0 , v 1 , . .., v h = v) be the nodes on the unique path from the root to v. We examine each one of the possible noise patterns that affect only this path. That is, for each node v i we decide whether it is corrupted or not; there are at most 2 d different such noise patterns. For any fixed noise pattern, we verify that all the other edges (v i , v i+1 ) are consistent with the behavior of the simulation, and reject the noise pattern if they are not. If no inconsistency is found, we show that a valid run of π ′ on some input with that noise pattern leads to v.
First, we recall that we assume that the complete protocol tree of π of depth |π| is reachable for some input given there is no noise at all; that is we prune all the redundant branches. 13 Assumption A.1. For any node v in the protocol tree of π there exists an input (x, y) such that an instance of π on (x, y) reaches v.
The Φ-reachability test of v is performed by Algorithm Reach(Φ, v) depicted below.
Claim A.2. Given an efficiently-computable set Φ, Algorithm Reach(Φ, v) takes time poly(2 d ).
Proof. It is easy to see that there are at most 2 d valid noise pattens for the path γ that should be considered. For each, we need to go over all possible leaves in π and perform O(d) checks per leaf; the number such leaves is upper bounded by 2 d . The total time is clearly poly(2 d ).
Theorem A.3. For any input node v and set Φ, Algorithm Reach(Φ, v) outputs Reachable if and only if there exists some input (x, y) ∈ F −1 (0) × F −1 (1) and some noise E ∈ Φ, such that π ′ (x, y) reaches v when the noise is described by E.
Proof. It is easy to see that if an inconsistency is found for some noise E at Step (3a) then the obtained γ cannot describe a valid instance of π ′ with the noise E (regardless of the input). If the inconsistency is found at Step (3b) it means that γ cannot describe a valid instance of π ′ with noise E and any input that leads to the leaf l, thus if Step (3b) fails for all leaves l, there is no input that leads to v assuming that specific noise pattern E.
It remains to show that if no inconsistency is found in steps (3a)-(3b), then the node v is Φ-reachable. This follows the same reasoning. Let l be the leaf in π and E an error noise pattern for π ′ such that when Algorithm Reach checks l, E it outputs that v is reachable. Since l is reachable in π (Assumption A.1), let (x, y) ∈ F −1 (0) × F −1 (1) be an input that leads π to the leaf l; note that (x, y) is a valid input for π ′ . It is easy to verify that running π ′ on (x, y) with the noise E yields exactly the path γ. Therefore, v is reachable.
